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Abstract
The standard model of optimal growth, interpreted as a model of a market economy with infinitely long-lived
agents, does not allow separation of the savings decisions of agents from the investment decisions of firms.
Investment is essentially passive: the "one good" assumption leads to a perfectly elastic investment supply; the
absence of installation costs for investment leads to a perfectly elastic investment demand. On the other hand,
the standard model of temporary equilibrium used in macroeconomics characterizes both the savings-
consumption decision and the investment decision, or, equivalently, derives a well-behaved aggregate demand
which, in equilibrium, must be equal to aggregate supply. Often, however, we want to study the movement of
the temporary equilibrium over time in response to a particular shock or policy. The discrepancy between the
treatment of investment in the two models makes imbedding the temporary equilibrium model in the growth
model difficult. This paper characterizes the dynamic behavior of the optimal growth model with adjustment
costs. It shows the similarity between the temporary equilibrium of the corresponding market economy and
the short-run equilibrium of standard macroeconomic models: consumption depends on wealth, investment
on Tobin's q. Equilibrium is maintained by the endogenous adjustment of the term structure of interest rates.
It then shows how the equivalence can be used to study the dynamic effects of policies; it considers various
fiscal policies and exploits their equivalence to technological shifts in the optimal growth problem.
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1. Introduction
The standard model of optimal growth, interpreted as a model of a market
economy with infinitely long—lived agents does not allow separation of the
savings decisions of agents from the investment decisions of firms.
Investment is essentially passive: the "one good" assumption leads to a
perfectly elastic investment supply; the absence of installation costs for
investment leads to a perfectly elastic investment demand.
On the other hand, the standard model of temporary equilibrium used
in macroeconomics, such as the Metzler [6] model for example, characterizes
both the savings—consumption decision and the investment decision, or,
equivalently, derives a well—behaved aggregate demand which, in equilibrium,
must be equal to aggregate supply.
Often, however, we want to study the movement of the temporary
equilibrium over time in response to a particular shock or policy. The
discrepancy between the treatment of investment in the two models makes
imbedding the temporary equilibrium model in the growth model difficult.
This is a particularly serious problem if the assumption of rational
expectations is made, as in this case expected future events affect the
current equilibrium and it becomes impossible to characterize the current
equilibrium without using an intertemporal model.
The obvious solution is to modify the optimal growth model by relaxing
one of the two assumptions which imply passive investment behavior. This
can be done either by introducing a two—sector technology which generates
a well—defined investment supply function (Srinivasan [7], Uzawa [91), or
it can be done by introducing installation or adjustment costs which
generate a well—defined investment demand function. The purpose of this
paper is to characterize the dynamic behavior of the optimal growth model
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with adjustment costs, to show the similarity between the temporary
equilibrium of the corresponding market economy and the temporary
equilibrium of standard short—run macroeconomic models, and finally to
show how easily this model can be used to study the dynamic effects of
shocks or policies. The paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 sets up and solves the optimal growth problem of an
economy with adjustment costs.
Section 3 characterizes the behavior of agents and firms in a market
economy which replicates the centralized economy described in Section 2.
Consumption decisions are made by intertemporally optimizing households;
at any point of time consumption is an increasing function of total wealth,
including human capital, evaluated at market interest rates. Investment
decisions are made by value—maximizing firms; at any point in time
investment is an increasing function of the shadow price of capital, in a
manner similar to Tobin's [81 q. The equality of saving and investment
is maintained at every point in time by the endogenous adjustment of
current and future market interest rates. The temporary equilibrium in
this model is similar to the standard IS relation of many short—run macro
models.
Section 4 formally proves the equivalence of the centralized and
market economies.
Sections 5 and 6 use this equivalence to study the effects of various
fiscal policies. To do this, we use the equivalence of these fiscal
policies in the market economy to technology shifts in the centralized
economy. We consider five different policies, lump—sum taxes, proportional
taxes on gross output, profit or consumption, and investment tax credits.
The proceeds of these taxes are either used for government spending or
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redistributed in lump—sum rebates. Section 5 shows equivalence and steady—
state effects. Section 6 studies the dynamic effects of lump—sum and
consumption taxes, depending on whether they are anticipated or
unanticipated, and whether the economy is in or out of steady state.
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2. The Centralized Economy
The central planning problem is the following:
2.1 max J U(ct)et dt subject to:
2.2 f(k) = + + h(i/k))
2.3 = — Sk ; k0 =
> 0, TJ() < 0, U'(O) =
> 0, f"(•) < 0, f'(O) =
h(0) = 0, h'() > 0, 2h'(•) + h"(•) > 0
All variables are in per capita terms, with standard interpretations.
This problem differs from the standard optimal growth problem only because
of the presence of costs of installation h(s). In order to undertake gross
investment of i units of capital, i units of output must be set aside to
be installed as capital, together with jh(j/k) units which are used during
installation. Thus gross investment per capita at rate i has an opportunity
cost of i(1 + h(i/k)) units of output.2 The properties of h(•) make the
total installation cost ih(i/k) nonnegative, convex with a minimum value
of zero which is attained when gross investment is zero. An alternative
formulation, which is as plausible, would make installation costs a
function of net investment; the net investment formulation is sometimes
technically more attractive, as it simplifies the characterization of the
steady state and of local dynamics.
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The Hamiltonian for this problem is
2.4 et[U(f(kt) - i(1 + h(i/k))) + y(f -
where is the shadow price, measured in units of utility, of an additional
unit of installed capital at time t.
The optimality conditions,3 defining x /k and H(x)
I + h(x) + xh'(x), are:
2.5 U' (c)H(x) = y
2.6 = ( + )y — U'(c)[f'(k) + x h'(x)J
—t
2.7 lim e yk = 0
t-o
Consider (2.5) first. H(x) is the marginal opportunity cost of
investment. Thus the condition states that this marginal cost measured
in units of utility must be equal to y.
Consider (2.6). x h'(x) is the reduction in the opportunity cost
of installation ih(i/k) made possible by an additional unit of capital.
Therefore f'(k) + x h'(x) is the total marginal product of capital.
Solving (2.6) subject to the transversality condition (2.7) gives:
2.8 = J U'(c)[x2 h'(x) + f(k )}e
)(st) ds
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This states that y in turn must be equal to the present discounted value
of marginal products, also measured in units of utility.
Steady state and dynamics
If y = k = 0, x 6 and the steady—state capital stock is given by a
modified "modified golden rule": f'(k) +
(j3 + + h(6) + 6h'(6)). This implies f'(k) > ( + 6). This comes
from installation costs which make the opportunity cost larger than in the
standard optimal growth model.
The system (2.3,5,6) is a dynamic system in (k, y, x) where either y
or x can beeflminated. Although y plays an important conceptual role, it
is more useful to characterize the dynamics in terms of (k, x) as the
movement of k, x and c can be directly obtained from the phase diagram.
Eliminating c in (2.5) using (2.2), differentiating (2.5) with
respect to time and eliminating y using (2.6) gives:
2.9 [H'(x) - (H(x))2k] [(6+6)H(x) - x2h'(x) - f'(k)}
- U'() H(x)[f'(k) - X(i + h(X))]k
This equation, together with k = k(x — 6), characterizes the equations of
motion. The complete characterization is done in the appendix; the results
are displayed in Figures I and II.
The steady state is a saddle point equilibrium. The transversality
condition requires the system to be on the unique stable path. Convergence
of x and k to their equilibrium values is monotonic. Figure II draws iso-
1%
re
a
I'(s): t( I;.
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consumption loci. Iso-consumption loci satisfy: f(l:) — kx(1 + h(x)) =
constant and for a given x, reach their maximum at k such that f'(k) =
x(1 + h(x)) . This allows us to characterize the behavior of consumption
in Figure I, at least between points A and B. Consumption is monotonically
increasing when the steady state is approached from the northwest,
monotonically decreasing when the steady state is approached from the
southeast.
8
3. The Market Economy
We now consider an economy in which agents have the same utility function
and firms the same technology as in the previous section. We characterize
the maximization problem of firms and agents and show the role of the
sequence of interest rates in clearing the goods market.
Value maximization by firms
Production is carried out by many identical competitive firms. For
notational simplicity, the number of firms is equal to the number of agents
so that the same symbol denotes the ratio of a variable per capita or per
firm.
Each firm faces a time path of interest rates {r } . The
_ft rdv t [O,c)
discount factor e
°
gives the rate at which output at time t can
be traded for output at time zero.
For simplicity, we do not explicitly model the labor market. As labor
is in fixed supply, labor market equilibrium and the above normalization
imply that there will be one worker per firm, each firm facing a time path
of wage bills {w } . Thus the decision problem of the representative
t = [O,c)
firm is to choose a time path of investment which maximizes the present
value of its cash flow:
V = J[f(kt)
— i(1 + h(i/k)) — w]pdt subject to:
= i — Skt
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The Hamiltonian for this problem is:
Pt[f(kt) — :1t(1
+ h(i/k)) — w + q(i —
The optimality conditions,3 recalling the definitions of and H(x), are
3.1
H(xt)
3.2 = (r + — [ft(k) + x h'(x)]
3.3 urn p 0
t
Consider (3.1) first. It states that investment takes place until the
marginal cost of investing equals the shadow value of installed capital.
As H'() > 0 the equation can be inverted to give i/k as an increasing
function of q, in. a manner similar to Tobin's q theory of investment.
Condition (3.2) can be solved subject to the transversality condition
(3.3) to give:
= [x h'(x) + f'(k)]e ds
The shadow price q is the present value of marginal products. Note the
similarities and dissimilarities with equation (2.8) in the centralized
economy: returns are measured in units of output, not in units of
utility and the discount rate depends on the market—determined interest
rate.
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After having paid wages to workers, the firm has to decide how to
distribute profit and finance investment. It may finance investment by
retaining earnings or by issuing shares or bonds. All financing schemes
are equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same path of consumption
and investment; they differ, however, in terms of institutional arrangements.
A notationally and conceptually simple financing scheme is that firms
finance investment by retaining earnings and never issue new shares or
bonds. In this case, equilibrium personal savings would be zero at every
point in time. Note also that in the absence of a bond market, interest
rates would not be directly observable.
We adopt a slightly different scheme, in which firms finance themselves
both by retaining earnings and by issuing new bonds. Specifically,
replacement investment is financed out of retained earnings and net
investment is financed by bonds. Let Bt be the number of bonds per capita
outstanding at time t, each paying r units of output at time t. The net—
of—interest cash flow of the firm is
f(k) - kx(1 + h(x)) - w - rB
The dividend distributed by the firm is output less depreciation, wages
and interest:
= f(kt) - k(1 + h(6)) - w - rB
The excess of dividends over net—of—interest cash flow must be financed
by issuing new bonds:
11
3.6 = k[x(1 + h(x)) - + h()J]
There is a simple relation between the value of the owners' equity,
the value of the firm's liabilities, the shadow value q and the capital
stock:
3.7 qk Vt = Bt + pds
The second equality simply reflects the fact that the value of the
firm is equal to the sum of its liabilities and owners1 equity and that
it is independent of the method of financing. The first equality is more
interesting; it says that "average q" and "marginal q" are equal, implying
therefore a simple relation between investment and the observable average
value. This equality depends on the production and investment installation
functions being linearly homogeneous in labor, capital and investment. The
proof is a special case of Hayashi [3].
Utility maximization by consumers
Each consumer supplies one unit of labor inelastically and receives a wage
w. His only decision problem is to choose a sequence of consumption which
maximizes the present value of utility:
I U(c )e_t
Jo t
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The wealth constraint can be expressed as:
= + w + rB — c ; urn PtBt 0
t±co
Income is the sum of wages, interest on bond holdings and dividends. It
must be allocated either to consumption or to savings in the form of bonds,
Bt. The Hamiltonian for this problem is:
e_t[U(ct) + X( + w + rB — c)j
3
The optimality conditions are
3.8 U'(c) =
3.9 A = — r )X
t t t
3.10 lim et = 0
t*3
Equations 3.8 and 3.9 determine the path of the rate of change of marginal
utility. The level of this path is determined by the wealth constraint,
which can be written as
0 * * r
i0 cpdt V + V ; V = qk, V j wpdt
This shows that consumption depends on both nonhuman and human wealth.
It also shows how q enters both the investment decision of firms and the
consumption decision of consumers.
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The condition for equilibrium in the goods market is that output
equals spending:
3.11 k) = c + kx(1 + h(x)J
This condition, together with the anticipation that this condition
will hold at all future times, determines at any instant the complete term
structure of interest rates. The temporary equilibrium of this economy is
similar to the IS relation of closed—economy macroeconomic models. Aggregate
demand is the sum of consumption and investment. Consumption is an increasing
function of total wealth in the spirit of Metzler. Investment is an
increasing function of the ratio of market value to capital in the spirit
of Tobin. Aggregate demand is brought into equality with aggregate supply,
in this full employment model, by the endogenous adjustment of the term
structure of interest rates.
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4. Equivalence of the Two Economies
To show equivalence, we must first show that the equations of motion of the
market economy replicate those of the centralized one. Consider the two
shadow prices of the market economy, A1, associated with consumption and
associated with investment. Define y E qX. From (3.1) and (3.8),
4.1 = U'(c)H(x)
This is identical to (2.5). Differentiating with respect to time:
4.2 y Xq +Xqt tt tt
Substituting (3.2) for q1, (3.9) for A, we obtain
= + 6)Aq — X[f'(k) + x h'(x)]
This gives an expression in which interest rates do not appear. Using
(3.8) and the definition of y gives:
4.4 = + - U'(c){f'(k) + x h'(x)]
This is identical to (2.6) in the centralized economy. The shadow price
is therefore the product of the consumption and investment shadow prices.
We must now show that the transversality conditions of the market
economy imply the transversality condition of the centralized economy.
Equations (3.3) for and (3.9) for imply respectively
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4.5a urn + urn < urn r , as — = — r
q k t p tt--' t t— t t-÷° t
A
4.5b urn = — urn
rttD t t-
Note that both transversality conditions depend on the market—determined interest
rate. Differentiate logarithmically yk = qAk with respect to time:
4.6 + - + +
k
—
At k
which implies limi— + —i< from the two conditions above. This is the
kt)
transversality condition (2.7) of the centralized economy.
The equivalence between the two economies is hardly surprising. It
is nevertheless very useful as it allows, when studying the effects of
various shocks or policies, to use the equations of motion of the centralized
economy with its unique shadow price rather than the equations of motion of
the market economy with the two shadow prices which themselves depend on
market—determined interest rates. This is what we do now, using this
equivalence to study the effects of various fiscal policies.
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5. Fiscal Policies and Technological Shifts
Extending Halls [2] analysis from the standard optimal growth model, we
study the following fiscal policies: a head tax——or lump—sum tax——in
amount 0 per agent; a proportional tax on gross output f(k), at rate
a proportional tax on profit4 (f(k) — w) , at rate 02; a proportional tax
on net output (f(k) - kx(1 + h(x))), at rate O3 which can also be
interpreted as a tax on consumption; finally an investment tax credit,
which we treat as a proportional subsidy to investment spending
kx(1 + h(x)), at rate 04• All these policies are balanced budget policies
and are either refunded as lump—sum taxes or used for government spending
in a way which does not affect private investment or consumption decisions.
We now consider three types of technological shifts, a, b, and n which
affect the production and installation functions. These functions become
(1—a)f(k) — a and (1_b)kx(1 + h(x)) respectively.
It is now straightforward to show the equivalence of each fiscal
policy to a combination of these technological shifts. These equivalences
are given in Table I. If, as in the third column of the table, the
government uses tax revenue to purchase current output, then the output
available to the private sector declines by the amount of the tax revenue.
Alternatively, if the government redistributes tax revenue via lump—sum
rebates, as in column two, then output available to the private sector is
unchanged by the imposition of taxes. To study the effect of a policy in
the decentralized economy, we may instead study the effects of the
equivalent combination of technological shifts in the centralized economy.
Once the behavior of consumption, investment and output is characterized,
it is relatively easy to deduce the market clearing sequence of interest
rates in the market economy.
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Table I Equivalence of fiscal policies and technological shifts
Tax\in combination with:
Head tax, 00
Gross output tax, rate
Profit tax, rate 02
Net output tax, rate 03
(consumption tax)
Investment subsidy, rate 04
—01f(k)
02f
02; a =
b =
03
—03(f(k)—kx(1+h(x)J)
a =
—O2kf'(k)
=
03
lump—sum rebates government spending
a =
oo
a =
01
a
02
a =b
a=
a=
a=
b=
04 b=04
O4kx(1+h(x)J
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The relevant equations, including the equations of motion, of the
centralized economy are direct extensions of (2.2) to (2.9):
5.1 (1-a)f(k) - (1_b)kx(1 + h(x)) - o = c
5.2 U'(c)H(x)(l—b) = y
5.3 y = (+)y - U'(c)[(l-a)ft(k) + (1—b)x2 h'(x)]
5.4 k = k(x—ó)
5.5 [H'(x) - (1-b)(H(x))2 k] =
- 2 h'(x) - f'(k)]
- H(x) [(1-a)f'(k) - (1-b)x(1 + h(x))J
Consider first the steady—state effects of these policies. Setting
x = k = 0 gives, from (5.4) and (5.5),
= [(+)H(o) - 2 h'()]
Two of the policies, the head tax (a = b = 0) and the net output tax
(a = b = 3), have no effect on the steady—state capital stock; their full
effect is on consumption which decreases by the amount of tax. The
investment subsidy (a = 0, b = 04) increases the capital stock while both
the gross output and profit taxes (a =
01 or 02 b = 0) decrease it.
19
The more interesting effects are the dynamic effects. Going through
all dynamic effects for all policies would exhaust the reader's patience.
In the next section we consider two simple policies——a head tax and a
consumption tax——both used to finance government spending.
20
6. Dynamic Effects of Lump—sum and Consumption Taxes
Lump—sum taxes
As shown in the previous section, the steady—state capital stock is
independent of changes in lump-sum taxes. Thus, if the economy is in
steady state when there occurs a permanent unanticipated increase in
lump—sum taxes of ia, consumption immediately and permanently decreases
by There is no effect on investment, or the capital stock at any
point of time.
Now consider an economy which is outside of steady state, for example
at point A in Figure III, when there is an unanticipated permanent increase
in c. Whether the equations of motion (5.4) and (5.5) of (x, k) are
affected depends on whether — , the coefficient of absolute curvature
——or absolute risk aversion in a different context——which we denote by cL(c),
is affected by a change in c.
Suppose c(c) is constant, i.e. c'(c) 0. The time path of marginal
U'(c)
rates of substitution U'(c Vs,t is unaffected by an equal absolute
decrease in consumption of tc at every point in time. Thus, if ct'(c) 0,
the effect of a permanent change in c is to crowd out private consumption
immediately and permanently by 100%, with no effect on capital accumulation
Suppose now c(c) > 0 Yc, so that an equal absolute decline in
consumption increases the marginal utility of consumption by more
when consumption is high. Consider the case in which the steady state is
approached from the northwest, such as point A in Figure III and consumption
is increasing over time. An equal absolute decline in consumption would
therefore increase future marginal utility more than present marginal
utility; this in turn would lead consumers to increase future consumption.
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This suggests that in this case, the increase o will initially crowd out
consumption by more than 100% and therefore increase investment. A proof
is given in Appendix B.
Let us refer to the path which would have been followed in the absence
of the fiscal change as the "original't path. As the steady—state capital
stock is unaffected, investment must decrease below its original path
during some time. At the time when investment has the same value as on the
original path, capital and output are higher and thus consumption plus taxes
must be higher than on the original path. Thus, consumption must before
that time have increased faster than on the original path, and must increase
more slowly after that time. In the decentralized economy, this is
accomplished by a twist in the term structure of interest rates, with an
increase in r in the short run and a decrease in r in the long run.
The opposite argument holds if the steady state is approached from the
southeast, with decreasing consumption. The argument and conclusions are
reversed if a'(c) < 0, i.e. if the utility has decreasing absolute curvature
(risk aversion).
We now consider the effects of an anticipated increase in lump—sum
taxes. For convenience, we assume that the economy is initially in steady
state, that a = b = 0 and that cL'(c) 0. Relaxing these restrictions
complicates the exposition but changes nothing of substance.
It is easier to understand the effects by working backward in time.
Suppose that the increase is implemented at time t but known as of time
t0 < t. At time t*,y, the costate variable cannot have an anticipated
discontinuity5; therefore c and x have to satisfy the following two
relations:
£ 
0 
0 
C,
iE
:
c+ (r+kC wJ
'c' Htz)
SD A'
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y = Ut(c*)H(x*)
c + k x + h(x )) = f(k ) —t* t' t t' t*
These two loci are drawn in Figure IV. An increase in 0 causes a downward
jump in both c and x. The relative size of jumps in c and x depends on the
ratio of convexities Ht(x)/Utt(c). If there are no adjustment costs, the
adjustment will come entirely from investment. If utility is nearly
linear, most of the adjustment will be in consumption.
Given the assumption that c2'(c) 0, the equations of motion in the
(k, x) plane are not affected by the change in policy. Two possible paths,
corresponding to two different jumps in x at time t, are characterized in
Figure III. They are EA0A1A2E and EAA1AE.
Unless utility is linear, the anticipation of the tax increase will
reduce consumption and increase investment. When the tax increase takes
place, it does not fall entirely on consumption but falls also on
investment. Net investment is negative and capital is decumulated back
to its steady state level. Consumption keeps decreasing after the
increase in taxes until it reaches its lower steady state value.
The temporary accumulation of capital smooths the effects of the tax
on consumption. Because of adjustment costs, the smoothing is not complete
and there is a discontinuous fall in consumption at the time of the tax
increase. In the absence of adjustment costs, there would be no such fall
and consumption would decrease continuously from the time of the announcement.
What is the associated sequence of rates which will replicate this
path of consumption and investment? The interest rate at time t' must be
infinitely negative for an instant in order to generate the discontinuous
23
decreases in consumption and investment. (This unappealing feature is due
to the discontinuity in a and could be eliminated either by moving to
discrete time as in Hall [211 or by making a(t) continuous.) From Figure III
and equation (3.9), as consumption may be increasing or decreasing between
and t, and is decreasing after t*, short rates may be either above or
below their initial value of between t0 and t, and are lower than
after t.
In summary, a permanent increase in lump—sum taxes has no steady—state
effect, except on consumption which it crowds out completely. If the
increase is unanticipated, it crowds out consumption instantaneously by
100% if the economy is initially in steady state; if the capital stock is
below steady state, the immediate effect is to decrease consumption by more
than, less than, or exactly 100%——and increase, decrease or leave unchanged
investment——depending on whether — is an increasing, decreasing or
constant function of c. If the increase in taxes is anticipated, the
anticipation itself increases investment and decreases consumption; the
implementation decreases both investment and consumption. This reflects
the desire of consumers to smooth the path of anticipated consumption.
Consumption taxes
The effects of a permanent net output, or consumption, tax are very
similar to the effects of a lump—sum tax. They will be stated with
only a sketch of a proof given in the appendix. Some of the results
below assume that a = 0.
An unanticipated permanent increase in the tax rate completely
crowds out consumption and has no effect on investment and the capital
stock if the economy is initially in steady state. If the economy is
24
not initially in steady state, the dynamic behavior depends on the
coefficient of relative curvature (c) — If the capital stock
is lower than its steady—state value, a permanent unanticipated increase
in the tax will crowd out private consumption initially by more than, less
than or exactly 100% depending on whether t(c) is positive, negative or
zero.
The effects of an anticipated increase in the tax rate depend on the
value of (c). If (c) is identically equal to unity, i.e. the utility
function is logarithmic, there is no anticipation effect: consumption
does not change before the change in the tax and falls when the tax is
imposed. This paradoxical result was noted by Hall and we borrow his
explanation. If we view the tax as a consumption tax, the announcement
has two effects, a substitution effect in favor of consumption before the
tax increase and an income effect which tends to decrease current
consumption. If 1, the two effects cancel each other. In general,
consumption decreases, remains unchanged, or increases depending on whether
(c) is greater than, less than or equal to unity.
25
7. Conclusion
We have developed a dynamic model of saving and investment based on
competitive optimizing consumers and firms. In the short—run equilibrium
of this model, consumption is an increasing function of total wealth and
investment is an increasing function of the shadow price of installed
capital relative to the price of output. The determination of these two
components of aggregate demand is consistent with many short—run macro
models. Put differently, this paper provides a consistent intertemporal
framework in which to embed standard IS relations, and thus to characterize
more fully the dynamic effects of shocks or policies.
Harvard University
26
Appendix A. Dynamics in the (k, x) space
The equations of motion are given by (2.3) and (2.9):
k = k(x - 6) and
A1x = A2 + A3k where
A1
H'(x) - (R(x))2k > 0
A2 ( + 6)H(x) - x2h'(x) - f'(k)
A3
- H(x)[f'(k) - x(i + h(x))J
Consider the locus A2 0. It is such that
dXAO =
+ - 0 as x - + 6
Consider the locus A3 = 0. It is such that
= fc:k) <
dk
A —o H(x)
3
We can draw in Figure V, the loci k 0, A2 = 0 and A3 0. Note that
(A2
0) and (A3 = 0) have the same value of k for x + 6, and that
(A2
0) and (k = 0) intersect at the steady state E. The three loci
divide the (k, x) plane into seven regions. Table II gives the signs
of the components of x, (A2, A3, 1c) for each region. It follows from
Table II that x = 0 lies in regions II, III and VI and passes through B.
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0-I0SVSS
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S
S
S
S
S
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I
S
S
01•'
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It also follows that the equilibrium is a saddle point equilibrium as
drawn in Figures I and II in the text.
Table II
Region Sign of: A2 A3
k x
I - - + -
II + - + ?
III — + + ?
Iv + + + +
V - + - -
VI + + - ?
VII + - - +
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Appendix B. Effects of an unanticipated permanent head tax outside of
steady state
We consider the case in which a' (c) > 0 and the steady state is reached
from the northwest so that consumption is increasing. This case
corresponds to region III in Figure V.
We first show that for any (k, x) point in region III, including the
stable arm, x is now more negative than before the increase in i, de.
From (5.5) in the text:
dxtkX
[H'(x) + a(c)(1-b) (H(x))2k1 x
{- a' (c)H(x) [(1—a)f' (k) - (1-b)x(1 + h(x)) ]k(x-6)
+ a'(c)(1-b)(H(x))2kx}d
From Table II, dxkx < 0 in region III.
For any point in region III below the original stable arm, x falls
too rapidly to reach E under the original laws of motion. Since x falls
even more rapidly under the new laws of motion, the new stable path to E
cannot lie below the original stable path, Therefore the new stable path
lies above the original stable path.
The case in which the steady state is approached from the southeast and
the cases associated with a' (c) < 0 can be analyzed in a similar way.
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Appendix C. Dynamic effects of a permanent consumption tax
If a = 0 and a = b, (5.5) can be rewritten as:
[H'(x) +(f(k) - kx(1 + h(x)J)1(H(x))2k(c)]x =
[( + )H(x) - x2ht(x) - f'(k)J +
[f(k) - kx(1 + h(x))] 1(f'(k) - x(1 + h(x)))H(x)(c)
(
cU"(c)
C — U'(c)
Thus if '(c) = 0, the equations of motion of k and x are unaffected
by a change in the consumption tax. If '(c) + 0, an analysis similar to
the one used in Appendix B can be used to characterize the shift in the
stable arm.
To characterize the effects of an anticipated increase in the tax at
time t say, consider the movements in c and x at time t. c arid x
satisfy (5.1) and (5.2), with a = 0, a = b. Differentiating with respect
to c, x and a gives:
dx = U' (c)H(x) [1 -
dc = _1[_ U'(c)H'(x)c - (1-a)k(H(x))2U'(c)]
where U'(c)H'(x)(l-a) — W'(c)(H(x)J2(1—a)2k.
If (c) 1, then dx = 0. If (c) 1, then '(c) 0 and the
equations of motion are unchanged; thus if x does not jump at time t,
30
it remains constant for all t. If F(c) + 1, then dx + 0 and the results
given in the text follow from the phase diagram.
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Footnotes
1. This paper was written while the first author was at the University of
Chicago. We thank Fumio Hayashi, Frederic Mishkin, Michael Mussa and
the members of the Money and Banking Workshop at the University of
Chicago for their comments. Financial support from the Sloan
Foundation and the National Science Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged.
2. This formalization of adjustment costs is based on Eisner and Strotz
[1] and Lucas [51
3. This problem satisfies the conditions of Weitzman's theorem [10],
so that these conditions are necessary and sufficient.
4. Hall does not have labor explicitly as a factor of production, so that
he does not distinguish between the gross output and profit taxes.
5. This follows from theorem 2 in Kemp and Long [41
